2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-7-2013

De Huo Wang v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"De Huo Wang v. Attorney General United States" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1159.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1159

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3660
___________
DE HUO WANG,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-977-101)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Dorothy Harbeck
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 1, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 7, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM

De Huo Wang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying a motion to reopen. For the reasons
that follow, we will deny the petition for review.
I.
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties and have previously discussed
the background of the case, see De Huo Wang v. Att’y Gen., No. 11-3217, 485 F. App’x
580 (3d Cir. 2012), we will recite the facts only as necessary to our decision. Wang was
charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A), as an alien who was inadmissible
at the time of entry into the United States. He conceded removability and applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),
arguing that he was and would be persecuted in China as a result of the country’s
coercive population control policy. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Wang’s
testimony lacked credibility and determined that, even if he had been credible, his
allegations would not entitle him to relief. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination and dismissed Wang’s appeal in July 2011. Wang’s
petition for review from that order was denied by this Court because substantial evidence
supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Wang, 485 F. App’x at 583.
In 2012, while his petition for review was pending before this Court, Wang filed
with the BIA a motion to reopen proceedings seeking to amend his applications for
asylum and withholding of removal and to present evidence of changed country
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conditions. Wang claimed that he began attending a Christian church in August 2011,
and that he feared being persecuted by the Chinese government for his practice of
Christianity. The BIA concluded that Wang’s motion was untimely and that he did not
establish that reopening was nevertheless warranted based on changed circumstances.
Wang now seeks review of the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen.1
An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the
BIA ―no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was
rendered[.]‖ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for
motions to reopen that rely on evidence of ―changed circumstances arising in the country
of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have
been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]‖ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Wang does not dispute that his motion to reopen was untimely, and we agree with
the BIA that the evidence he submitted ―does not show a material change in China
regarding the treatment of unsanctioned religious groups since [Wang’s] June 2009
hearing.‖ A.R. 3-4. Although Wang argued that the persecution of Christians has
escalated, the BIA noted that the record indicated ―ongoing and substantially similar
treatment of unsanctioned religious groups.‖ A.R. 4. In fact, Wang submitted in support
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s denial of
Wang’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our review.
See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, to succeed on his
petition for review, Wang must show that the BIA’s decision was ―arbitrary, irrational, or
contrary to law.‖ Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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of his motion to reopen a report produced by Amnesty International in 2007, which
indicated that the Chinese government ―continued to crack down on religious observance
outside officially sanctioned channels.‖ A.R. 99 (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Department of State’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which Wang
submitted in support of his original application for relief, described ongoing harassment
of unsanctioned religious groups. A.R. 383-87. This, along with other record evidence,
amply supports the BIA’s determination that Wang failed to demonstrate a change in
circumstances ―arising in‖ China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Thus, the only
changes in circumstance Wang could demonstrate were personal and do not suffice to
excuse the time limitation on his motion to reopen. Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145,
149–51 (3d Cir. 2009).
Because the denial of Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of
discretion, see Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 153, we will deny his petition for review.2
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We need not address the BIA’s alternate determination that Wang failed to establish
prima facie eligibility for relief because his motion to reopen was untimely. Any error in
that aspect of the BIA’s decision—including its reliance on the IJ’s prior credibility
determination—would have been harmless and would not justify granting the petition for
review. Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (―[W]e will view
an error as harmless and not necessitating a remand to the BIA when it is highly probable
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.‖).
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